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Patrick Michael Laboon 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the methods utilized by the leadership of the People’s 
Republic of China to foster relations with and spread Maoist ideology to Third World 
nations, which lasted throughout the Mao Era, from 1949-1976. While nations of Latin 
America and Asia were part of this initiative, of particular interest to this study is the 
development of relations between the PRC and various nations within the African continent. 
A number of studies on this subject, within the broader context of Chinese foreign relations, 
have attempted to ascribe meaning to these internationalist pursuits in a variety of ways. One 
of the defining questions which differentiates these studies hinges on to what degree the 
impact and importance of ideology, as opposed to more pragmatic and strategic goals, 
played in the adoption of these internationalist policies. However, this binary 
conceptualization of Chinese foreign policy not only ignores a significant number of 
influential factors, but is also at its core unanswerable. Whether Mao or other leaders 
undertook efforts to spread influence abroad cannot be determined simply as a pragmatic or 
ideologically motivated policy, for ideology shapes one’s notion of what is practical. While 
many historians have attempted to solidify their own personal arguments on the subject, the 
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complexities of the time period, and porosity between the concepts of ideology and 
practicality has hampered any attempts to definitively answer this question.  
Breaking from these trends, this thesis intends to analyze not why, but how PRC 
leadership took on the enormous task of promoting relations with African nations to both the 
Chinese people and to the various peoples of Africa. Newspaper articles from People’s 
Daily, propaganda posters, official speeches and diplomatic communications, amongst other 
sources and studies have been utilized to analyze the strategy behind this initiative. To 
promote Sino-African relations to their own people, the PRC relied upon using familiar 
elements of nationalism to promote the unfamiliar concept Maoist internationalism. Yet at 
the same time, key tenets of China-centered internationalism also called back upon China’s 
long history as a regional superpower. Within Africa, China’s understanding of many 
African nations positions as newly liberated states helped them formulate programs for aid 
with no strings attached and assurances of diplomatic friendship, which still propel Sino-
African relations today. African leaders, who picked and chose elements of Maoism to 
adjunct with their own native ideologies and goals, accepted these ties to create a 
relationship defined by mutualism. While an essential aspect of the original Maoist 
interpretation of ‘internationalism’ required violent world revolution led by the Chinese 
nation, historical developments and pressing foreign policy matters reshaped this Chinese-
led internationalism into a sustained policy of non-intervention and peaceful coexistence 
based upon the tenets of defensive anti-imperialism rather than aggressive revolution. While 
the revolutionary ideologies of African liberation movements and that of Maoist 
Internationalism shared many similarities, it was this adherence to the simple respect for 
national sovereignty that has sustained Sino-African relations for the past half-century.  
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I. Introduction: Building Sino-African Relations 
Relations between China and Africa have a long-standing history. Some historians 
estimate that trade and communication between China and parts of North-East Africa could 
have occurred as long as two thousand years ago, and there is amble evidence of a wide 
reaching trade network between China, India, the Middle East, and Africa from as early as 
the 8th century.1 Trade continually flourished between Africa and the various dynasties of 
China throughout the centuries, but there was still very little contact between the two regions 
besides hearsay and tales from middlemen traders. Finally, between 1405 and 1433, the 
Chinese admiral Zheng He made several voyages throughout the Indian Ocean, and even 
landed his great ships on African shores. Yet despite Zheng’s discoveries and acquisitions of 
many goods throughout his travels in Africa, upon his return the Ming government turned its 
back on Africa and set the precedent for future Chinese foreign relations by ending any 
further exploration missions.2 As such, there were very few developments in Sino-Africa 
relations until the founding of the People’s Republic. 
 China’s renewed interest in Africa in the Maoist Era was fueled by a new desire to 
unite the peoples of the world as brothers in socialism. As China emerged as a “new” state 
under new leadership, independence movements around the world similarly began to gain 
traction in. China took advantage of these similarities by strongly supporting these 
movements in order to gain diplomatic recognition. Yet at the same time, national leaders in 
the Third World and aspiring freedom fighters took advantage of this opportunity to help 
facilitate their own liberation from the superpowers and their allies. This relationship began 
                                                
1 Jinyuan Gao, “The Development of Relations over Many Centuries,” African Affairs 83.331, (1984): 
241-243, accessed November 17, 2014, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/721561. 
 
2 Ibid, 244-246. 
  2 
when one of Africa’s few independent nations, Egypt, officially recognized China at the 
Bandung Conference in April 1955.3 Throughout the Maoist Era until today, Chinese leaders 
have relied on using the concept of fraternal, mutual development between Africa and China 
to promote diplomatic ties between the regions. Although the emphasis on socialism has 
faded, China’s attempts to woo African states have been a great success, as today around 
90% of African nations have established relations with China.4 From the 1950’s onward, 
Africa and China were no longer two regions in contact by way of envoys and middlemen. 
China sought to establish a direct relationship with Africa, and over time would become a 
major player in a part of the world ignored by many. 
 The relationship between China and Africa was fostered to a great degree by the 
efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to support independence movements around the 
African continent. Donovan Chau describes how at the Eighth National CPC Congress in 
1956, Mao stated, “To achieve a lasting peace in the world, we must further develop our 
friendship and cooperation with the fraternal countries in the camp of socialism and 
strengthen our solidarity with all peace-loving countries.”5 One of China’s major objectives 
at this time was to create international unity between as many socialist-leaning states as they 
could, and Africa was shaping up to be a fertile breeding ground for revolution. These 
tactics were effective in part because in many cases these African independence movements 
were directly combatting the “evil imperialist” forces that China so openly opposed. As 
                                                
3 Jianjun Tu, “Sino-African Relations: Historical Development and Long-Term Challenges,” China: An 
International Journal 6.2, (2008): 331, accessed October 9, 2014, doi:10.1353/chn.0.0001.  
 
4 Ibid, 248. 
 
5 Donovan Chau, Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana and Tanzania, 
(Naval Institute Press, 2014), 16. 
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such, China utilized the notion of fraternalism to demonstrate to its own people the evils of 
capitalism, and foster relations with new African states at the same time. 
While China would soon come to bankroll many revolutionary movements 
throughout Africa, one of the first efforts to interact with the region was through the use of 
health diplomacy. “In 1963, Premier Zhou Enlai dispatched the first Chinese medical teams 
to Algeria. This inaugurated Chinese efforts to support African healthcare systems by 
providing medical personnel, equipment and supplies throughout the continent.”6 These 
medical teams functioned much like the barefoot doctors in rural China. While some 
specialists were employed, their duties mostly entailed providing “basic preventative care to 
rural areas that had previously lacked any such care.”7  
The Sino-African relationship of the 1960’s and 1970’s was also strengthened by 
Chinese military aid for aspiring African revolutionary movements. Remarkably, these 
contributions were not limited to solitary regimes, regions, or even ideological movements 
within Africa. Despite the youth and inexperience of “New China” on the world stage, Mao 
set out to support revolutionary movements of all sorts around the entire continent.  
China’s first foray into supporting revolution in Africa involved Algerian 
independence from France. Throughout the late 1950’s Algerian military delegations visited 
Chinese bases for training, and Chinese armaments and equipment soon popped up on 
battlefields around Algeria. The CIA estimated that starting in 1959 China spent around $15 
million in military aid for Algerian rebels.8 China also pursued forming friendships in West 
                                                
6 Jeremy Youde, “China’s Health Diplomacy in Africa,” China: An International Journal 8.1 (2010): 153, 
accessed October 9, 2014. doi: 10.1353/chn.0.0036. 
 
7 Ibid, 155. 
 
8 Donovan Chau, Exploiting Africa, 48-53. 
  4 
Africa, and in the early 1960’s they signed numerous friendship treaties with Ghana and 
began providing economic assistance. China even went so far as to set up a secret training 
camp for guerrilla fighters in Ghana to train African rebel movements from a variety of 
nations.9 On the other side of the continent, on Africa’s Eastern coast, China began 
supporting the communist movement on Zanzibar in 1960. When Tanganyika gained 
independence in 1961, China sought to bring some of the socialist fervor from Zanzibar to 
the mainland. While this dream may have been lost when the two states combined in 1964, 
China maintained good graces with the newly formed Tanzania, and eventually offered aid 
in the form of overt military training and assistance in building infrastructure projects.10 
Perhaps the most impactful of these projects was the construction of the Tanzam Railway, 
which linked rich copper-mines of landlocked Zambia to the trading ports along the coast of 
Tanzania.11 This massive project was completed in 1975, and stretched for 1,860 
kilometers.12 Some estimated that there were well over 10,000 Chinese migrants working on 
the railroad by 1971.13 Throughout the seven odd years of its construction, China continued 
to support Tanzania through a variety of other means including building military bases, 
water treatment plants and a stadium.14 These relationships eventually began to solidify 
China as not only a powerful player on the world stage, but a benevolent and friendly one at 
that. Guerrilla fighters from nations across the continent were sent to China for ideological 
                                                
9 Ibid, 84-85, 90. 
 
10 Ibid, 106, 114-116. 
 
11 Ibid, Exploiting Africa, 129. 
 
12 Jianjun Tu, “Sino African Relations: Historical Development and Long-Term Challenges,” 332. 
 
13 Donovan Chau, Exploiting Africa, 139. 
 
14 Donovan Chau, Exploiting Africa, 131-135. 
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and military training, and returned prepared to produce independence.15 As a result, on 
October 25th 1971, resolution 2758 was passed in the United Nations.16  The People’s 
Republic of China needed a two-thirds majority in order to become the representative of 
“China” in the United Nations over The Republic of China, and claim their spot on the 
Security Council. They received 76 out of 111 votes to win the nomination; 26 of the 
affirmative votes were from African nations.17 Today Sino-African relations have 
maintained their sense of fraternalism and cooperation, formed upon the basis of Maoist 
Internationalism and Zhou Enlai’s own policy of Peaceful Coexistence. However, there are 
many emergent challenges, which may endanger these relationships. While Chinese and 
African leaders continue to view their relationship as one of mutualism and cooperation, on 
the local level cracks are beginning to show. Outside of the era of ideology, these local 
events may slowly produce a crisis between a nation of Africa and China, which leaders will 
be forced to deal with. 
I have provided a very brief outline of the trajectory Sino-African relations, yet a few 
key aspects of this relationship remain unexplained. How exactly, did the leadership of the 
PRC facilitate this relationship? How were the Chinese people convinced to provide 
ideological support for the liberation movements of the people of a far off continent? How 
were concepts of Maoist Internationalism compatible with the ideologies and goals of 
African liberation leaders? While one may doubt the necessity of rousing public support for 
the policies of a single party dictatorship, the efforts of the CCP to educate the population 
                                                
15 Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, “A Plundering Tiger with Its Deadly Cubs? The USSR and China as 
Weapons in Engineering of a “Zimbabwean Nation,” Entangled Geographies: Empires and Technopolitics in 
the Global Cold War, Gabrielle Hecht, ed., (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011), 242. 
 
16 Jianjun Tu, “Sino African Relations: Historical Development and Long-Term Challenges,” 332. 
 
17 Donovan Chau, Exploiting Africa, 66. 
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about International Maoism reflect the importance placed upon these policies. Chapter II 
will elaborate upon how the ideology of Maoist Internationalism was “sold” to the Chinese 
public through nationalist propaganda. While a world system of fraternalism was 
emphasized in this media, a sense of leadership and centralism for the Chinese people 
elevated the the nation above their peers in the Third World as a benevolent savior.  
Chapter III will discuss the historical trajectory of Maoist Internationalism, and 
demonstrate its resilience throughout the commonly termed “isolationist” period that was the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution. I will demonstrate how Zhou Enlai’s policy of Peaceful 
Coexistence and dedication to Sino-Third World relations has persevered since the 1950’s, 
and survived the political tides of the Cultural Revolution due to its importance to China’s 
foreign policy program.  
Chapter IV will turn its gaze to Africa in an effort to navigate how the ideals and 
goals of African liberation movements newly liberated nations were compatible with Maoist 
Internationalism. The construction of the Tanzam Railway and will be used as a case study 
to demonstrate how the African origins of socialism and cross-cultural fraternalism were 
combined with Internationalist Maoism. The blossoming of relations between China and 
Africa, and the willingness of both parties to subscribe to a policy of mutual gain, was in a 
large part made possible by China’s commitment to anti-imperialism and Peaceful 
Coexistence, a promise that few other nations could keep.  
Finally, Chapter V will focus upon contemporary Sino-African relations, in an effort 
to gauge to what degree the concepts developed in the Maoist era still hold sway today. 
While African and Chinese leaders both publically state that the ties between their nations 
are as healthy as ever, racism, local turmoil, and the interconnectedness of their economies 
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may in time produce a crisis. While politically Sino-African relations may appear to be 
constructed upon a sturdy framework engineered by the goals of Maoist Internationalism, 
Peaceful Coexistence, and the desire for independence and liberation from imperialism, at 
the local level these ideological concerns may be trumped by more immediate desires.
  8 
II. Internationalism and Nationalism in Domestic Propaganda 
One major factor in the promotion of International Maoism within China was the use 
of propaganda posters. The policies promoted by this propaganda were unique in that they 
were some of the first attempts that China had made to actively pursue foreign policy 
abroad, rather than being a passive player to international forces. Given existing xenophobic, 
and even anti-socialist behaviors that some Chinese no doubt still held, the CCP was 
challenged to create propaganda that even those least inclined to International Socialism 
could accept. Through examining these representations, it can be realized that they 
functioned on two levels. To those already inclined and adjusted to the ideal of global 
socialism, these portrayals appealed to a humanistic sense of common identity, brought 
together through socialist revolution. However, they also functioned to call upon China’s 
own personal, national history – often reflecting the Chinese nation’s own long standing 
struggles against imperialist powers. Issues of national identity were utilized to promote new 
concepts of a shared human identity, serving to gain the support of even those with no deep 
belief in the ideals of socialism. In addition, to those with little care for the notions of shared 
human-identity, this nationalistic trend always placed China in a position of primacy 
amongst their supposedly equal foreign allies. If we are to believe that the aims of 
government propaganda during this time were realized, then many Chinese people saw 
themselves not as the oppressed pawns to a powerful dictator, but as a noble force working 
under a government which dedicated to helping others to avoid the terrors of China’s past, 
while leading the world towards peaceful coexistence. Many Chinese may not have believed 
in the ideals of international socialism and coexistence, whether from a dislike for socialism 
or for foreigners in general, yet the focus on China’s national character in these discourses 
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gave China a sense of primacy and leadership within this international context. Mao and 
other leaders within the CCP consciously applied this strategy of combining the national 
with the international in their propaganda to support the new ideals of International Maoism. 
A. Maoist Humanism 
In order to rally support for their new foreign relationships, Mao and the CCP were 
required to establish a common human identity by which to emphasize international 
socialism as a “natural” force of humanity. This image, of Mao as a humanist, may seem 
contradictory. For of course, Mao did separate humanity into dichotomies of “the people” 
and “the enemy,” stated that there is “no human nature above classes,” and encouraged 
people reject Confucian ideals like “benevolence is the characteristic element of 
humanity.”18 Mao’s own unique vision of humanism rejects these notions of “old 
humanism” in favor of believing that human equality and benevolence would only be 
captured after the destruction of class society.19  
The violent nature of the many speeches, posters and other forms of propaganda that 
are so often seen from this time period seem to disregard universal humanism in an effort to 
highlight the binary conflict between the envisioned “people” and “enemy”. However, 
analysis of the more positive-natured internationalist discourse reveals the structure behind 
the humanism promoted by Mao. Mao himself stated that, “To achieve a lasting peace in the 
world, we must further develop our friendship and cooperation with the fraternal countries 
                                                
18 K.T. Fann, “Mao’s Revolutionary Humanism,” Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Mar. 1979), 
144-146. 
 
19 Ibid, 148-149. 
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in the camp of socialism and strengthen our solidarity with all peace-loving countries.”20 
The Sino-Soviet split clearly reflects these beliefs, in that Mao rejected Soviet revisionism in 
favor of pursuing continued revolution against the imperialist forces of the world.21 While 
the Soviet Union’s decision to come of terms with the West and deescalate may seem like 
the more humanistic course of action, at this time Mao saw no hope for the ideal of world 
socialism and peace without the destruction of the inhuman “enemy”. Humanism was a part 
of Mao’s ideology, but it was firmly prioritized behind revolution. 
Engel’s statement that “Labor created humanity” in the context of human evolution 
from animals tied in neatly with Mao’s utopian vision of world socialism as the prerequisite 
for world peace. Mao envisioned the very earliest, primitive communities of humanity as 
peaceful, ideal communists. As such, Mao’s steadfast belief that revolution would bring 
about a return to this ideal was justified.22 As Sigrid Schmalzer aptly states:  
 
[Engels] Defining humans in terms of labor not only glorified the laboring classes 
but also allowed the possibility that, through labor, intellectuals, capitalists, and 
members of other suspect classes could reform. …The internationalist socialist 
version of humanism was meant to inspire revolutionary struggle against 
imperialism.23  
 
Change would come about to reform the world, and in the wake of Soviet revisionism China 
would be forced to lead this revolution.  
                                                
20 Donovan Chau, Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana and Tanzania, 
(Naval Institute Press, 2014), 16. 
 
21 William C. Kirby, “China’s Internationalization in the Early People’s Republic: Dreams of a Socialist 
World Economy,” The China Quarterly, No. 188, The History of the PRC (1949-1976), (Dec., 2006), 890. 
 
22 Sigrid Schmalzer, The People’s Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth-
Century China, (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 89-95. 
 
23 Ibid, 112. 
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The discovery of Peking Man in the 1920’s was utilized in the early years of the 
PRC to demonstrate a common origin of all the people of the world, conveniently stemming 
from China (later discoveries in Africa would move this location, although many Chinese 
still cling to this China-centered framework today).24 The idea brilliantly demonstrated that 
just as all mankind is one family, led (in a way) by an ancestor of Chinese origins, so too 
would the people of the world be reunited under socialism, with China again leading the 
charge. The ideology behind Maoist Internationalism may not be a reflection of Mao’s own 
good natured benevolence or human dignity, but the ambitious goals of his theory help 
reveal why China placed such a large emphasis on fostering foreign relations with Third 
World countries. Mao was violent and often unjust, but I do not believe that this is a 
reflection of selfishness or greed. The aims of Mao and the CCP were heavily rooted in the 
dogmatic, but idealistic, belief that the only way to achieve world peace was through world 
socialism. The foreign policies of Maoist China and methods by which this vision was 
communicated to the people reveal this. 
B. Propaganda on Two Levels: Internationalism 
Internationalist propaganda in Maoist China functioned to support the cause of 
humanism after revolution that Mao emphasized. As a result, these works typically fell into 
two distinct camps. One portrayed the “revolution” with violent depictions of foreign 
peoples, and the other portrayed “humanism” with images of foreign and Chinese people in 
harmony. Violence-based propaganda commonly focused on the revolutionary union 
between foreigners and the Chinese people against the aggressive imperialists. These works, 
                                                
24 Schmalzer, The People’s Peking Man, 103-105. 
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as seen in Figure 125, reflected the “revolution” stage of Mao’s vision for international 
socialism. In this image the “Red Sun” of Mao rises over a diverse array of foreign peoples, 
armed and determined to combat imperialism. The text encourages the Chinese people to 
“Vigorously support the anti-imperialist struggle for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America”26 Of particular interest is the traditional attire of the foreign fighters, a theme 
reflected in many portrayals during this time period. In Figure 227, this aspect can also be 
seen in portrayals of the “humanist” stage of International Maoism. In this image a broad 
array of foreign figures visit what appears to be a small Chinese town. Electrical lines and a 
factory in the distance accent the 
continual focus on socialist 
industrialization, while the town 
scene itself appeals to more 
traditional aspects of Chinese 
culture (a portrayal that probably 
would not be made in the 
impending Cultural Revolution). 
                                                
25 Zhou Ruizhang, “Jianjue zhichi Yazhou Feizhou Lading Meizhou renminde fandi douzheng,” Published 





27 Yu Huali, “You peng zi younfanglai,” Published by Tianjin meishu chubanshe (1961). 
Chineseposters.net, accessed 2/21/15, URL: http://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-211.php 
Figure 1: “Vigorously support the anti-
imperialist struggle for the peoples of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America” (坚决支持亚洲非洲拉丁美国
人民的反帝斗争) 1964. 
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Again the exotic clothing of the foreign people clearly stands out of these images. While 
these details are useful in demonstrating the diversity of the allied people in the struggle 
against imperialism, this “othering” of those foreign does align with some of the xenophobic 
tendencies China still held at this time. For despite the popularizing of ideals like “The 
Modern Races Are All One Family” and the notion of common human ancestry, racism was 
still a persistent issue in Maoist China.28 One Ghanaian student in China in the 1960’s even 
remarked that that doctors there couldn’t help but ask “why your skin is so black if you ever 
wash.”29 Despite this, blame for global racism and disdain was still firmly set in the lap of 
the imperialists.  An article from the People’s Daily in 1959 describes a rally held in Beijing 
in solidarity with the Congolese independence movement, in which “to the heroic Congolese 
and African people [the ralliers] extended a noble, brotherly tribute.” The article describes 
the “futile attempts [of 
the imperialists] to use 
brutal suppression and a 
variety of deceptive 
tactics in order to 
maintain their evil 
colonialist rule” and 
culminates by describing 
how “the Chinese people 
persistently feel deep 
                                                
28 Schmalzer, The People’s Peking Man, 108. 
 
29 Ibid, 108, 111. 
Figure 2: “Friends from afar are coming to visit” (1961). 
Note the traditional garb of the foreign peoples, and aspects 
of industrialization in the background juxtaposed to the 
traditional town gathering scene in the front. 
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sympathy for and firmly support the Congolese and African people’s righteous struggle.”30 
The CCP resolved the issue of racism not by confronting the existing biases of the Chinese 
people, but instead by simply placing racism and the other evils of the world at the feet of 
imperialism. Thus, “Chinese people could actively participate in solidarity rallies without 
ever questioning their racist assumptions.”31 In spite of this, more needed to be done to 
convince the population of the need to work outside China’s borders to support foreign 
liberation movements. The promotion of global socialist and international solidarity with 
groups of people that many Chinese had never had any interaction with was a hard sell. Mao 
and the CCP would attempt to accomplish this goal by ascribing China’s own national 
struggles to the international problems that faced their new allies. 
C. Propaganda on Two Levels: Nationalism 
 In the relatively short timespan between the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 and the death 
of Mao in 1976, China was envisioned as the true leader of the socialist world, and thus, the 
world of the future. This dream visualized China leading the rest of the world away from the 
temptations and chains of imperialism by utilizing the very strategies that allowed for the 
victory of the CCP in 1949. With this approach in mind, Mao and the CCP worked to instill 
in the Chinese people a sense of paternal fatherhood over the burgeoning independence 
movements in the Third World, based upon the established nationalist discourse. In the 
midst of World War II, long before the birth of the PRC, Mao attempted to solve the issue of 
nationalism in the context of internationalism: 
                                                
30 “Imperialists Get Out of the Congo! Get Out of Africa!” People’s Daily, Patrick Laboon, trans., 
(November 26, 1959), 1, URL: http://58.68.145.22/banshi.jsp. 
 
31 Schmalzer, The People’s Peking Man, 110-111. 
  15 
Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? We hold 
that he not only can be but must be…There is the “patriotism” of the Japanese 
aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our patriotism…China’s case, however, is 
different, because she is the victim of aggression. Chinese Communists must 
therefore combine patriotism with internationalism.32 
 
The struggles of China’s foreign allies in the Mao Era were similarly portrayed as battles 
against “aggressive” imperialists. As such, the struggles of these people could be construed 
to be the same struggles that China faced in confronting aggressive imperialist powers from 
the middle of the 19th century onwards. China’s civil war and Communist revolution in 
particular are cited as parallels to the struggles of the people of the Third World. Lin Biao, a 
high ranked military leader of the CCP, stated “Many countries and peoples in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America are now being subjected to aggression and enslavement…the basic 
political and economic conditions in many of these countries have many similarities to those 
that prevailed in old China.”33 Lin utilized this parallelism to describe Europe and the United 
States as the “cities of the world” in contrast to the imagined “rural” Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. In doing so, national memories of the Communist victory in the Civil War are 
evoked, in which the rural guerrilla fighters based out of Yan’an overtook the urban 
Nationalists. The victories of China’s socialist allies in the Third World would be reflections 
of the CCP’s victories in the Civil War.  
Of course, on a third level this also ties into the basic concept of Maoist socialism itself, 
where the ideal proletariat is more farmer than urban laborer. In this framework, nationalism 
is again stoked in that while the many countries of the Third World are still arising from 
                                                
32 Mao Zedong, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" (October 1938), Selected 
Works, Vol. II, p. 196, URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ mao/works/red-book/ch18.htm. 
 
33 Lin Biao, The International Significance of Mao-Tse Tung’s Theory of People’s War,” Foreign 
Languages Press (1965), Lin Biao Reference Archive (2003), URL: https:// 
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ch07.htm 
  16 
under imperialist aggression, China has already succeeded in doing so. Such a position 
places the Chinese people in a position higher than that of the other peoples of the world, 
despite the emphasis on socialist equality. In fact, this paternal standing requires China to 
assist the less fortunate, weaker revolutionaries from abroad. In a talk with some African 
visitors in 1963, Mao remarked, “In the fight for complete liberation the oppressed people 
rely first of all on their own struggle and then, and only then, on international assistance. 
The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for 
liberation. This is our internationalist duty.”34 The diction here places China as the state that 
has already “triumphed” (胜利 －victory, success, surpassing) in comparison to the Africa 
states that are “still struggling” (正在争取).35 Despite the good willed nature of the 
statement, there is still a slight elitist sentiment in this statement. With the USSR having 
already succumbed to revisionism by the 1960s, China sat alone as the true original and 
continued success story of socialism. Combine this with the proposed origin of mankind 
stemming from China, in the form of Peking Man, an image of China is constructed as the 
ideological and material leader of mankind, intent on brining back the natural and peaceful 
Communist society that our pre-class ancestors enjoyed.36 On this same scale, Mao could be 
the central paternal figure, a liberating figure to the people of the world just as he was to the 
Chinese. In Figure 337 Africans joyously read from Mao’s quotations, as the caption reads 
“Chairman Mao is the great liberator (jiuxing救星) of the world’s revolutionary people.”  
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In Figure 438 a baby is held aloft to the picture of Mao with “Long Live Chairman Mao” (毛
主席万岁, literally “Chairman Mao ten-thousand years”). The title of this poster is jiuxing 
(救星), liberator or savior, again placing Mao in a position of reverence above not just the 
Chinese, but all the people of the world. Keep in mind that these are works that were 
published in China, for a Chinese audience. In Chapter Five I will touch on the question of 
whether Africans and others in the Third World were really picking up books of Mao’s for 
the purpose of ideological education. What these images do prove, is that the Chinese 
government wanted their people to see their own national culture being adopted and utilized 
by the various people of the world. They wanted them to be proud of their nation and its 
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Figure 4: Jiuxing, Mao Zedong as 
a savior of the world’s people. Figure 3: Africans Read 
Quotations of Chairman Mao 
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contributions in bringing forth a new, peaceful world. These positive associations linked 
International Maoism and Chinese Nationalism in a mutual feedback loop, wherein 
nationalist sentiment supported efforts abroad, and efforts abroad bolstered nationalism at 
home.  
  
  19 
III. Revolutionary Pragmatism and the Cultural Revolution 
The Cultural Revolution is sometimes viewed as a purely domestic, or even 
isolationist event in Chinese history. In a time where the Chinese people were embroiled in 
constant civil conflict, and negotiations were frayed between China and both the United 
States and their former ally the Soviet Union, this viewpoint is easy to understand.39 Yet 
with this limited scope of Chinese foreign relations, a number of fascinating and significant 
relationships between China and other nations outside the Soviet and American spheres of 
influence would be ignored. In addition, taking this view of Chinese foreign policy 
disregards the great efforts many Chinese diplomats and leaders made to preserve and 
reform China’s international prestige during this chaotic period.  
During the early years of the Cultural Revolution, many in the Chinese bureaucracy 
were forced to find a balance between maintaining foreign relations while also encouraging 
the spirit of revolution internationally, to prevent their own purging from government. 
Power struggles between top leaders, and garnering the support of Mao, greatly affected the 
success of one’s policy for foreign relations. Yet despite these difficulties, China emerged 
from the Cultural Revolution as a major nation on the world stage, with strengthened 
diplomatic ties with the United States, a United Nations seat in place of Taiwan, and a place 
on the UN Security Council. While the Cultural Revolution may appear to be a period of 
isolation and international crisis, China’s continued focus on third-world relations was 
actually an essential aspect of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, during this period 
pragmatic leadership stemming from Zhou Enlai utilized these relationships to bolster 
China’s international reputation to new heights. 
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A. Foreign Relations and the Origins of the Cultural Revolution 
The trajectory and goals of Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution 
must be understood in context of the policies of the preceding years. Perhaps the most 
important shift in Chinese foreign policy in the first half of the 1960’s was the Sino-Soviet 
split. Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956 began to tear seams in Sino-Soviet 
relations, as Mao continued to hold Stalin as a figurehead and leader of socialism.40 Further 
disputes erupted as the Soviet Union continued to show meager support for China’s 
aggressive initiatives. Khrushchev showed little enthusiasm to support China in the Taiwan 
Straits crisis of 1958, refused to aid China in their pursuit of nuclear technology, and 
remained neutral during the Sino-Indian border clashes of 1962.41 The dissolving of 
relations between China and the Soviet Union would be a key factor in Mao’s desire to 
purge the revisionist factors in the CCP leadership by way of revolution. 
Mao’s rationale for launching the Cultural Revolution was undoubtedly influenced in 
part by this fear of Soviet-style revisionism being practiced in China, or at the very least his 
fear of facing the same criticism Stalin was given after his death. In a speech explaining the 
need for a Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao asks:   
…how much bourgeois ideology have [the Soviets] eliminated and how much 
proletarian ideology have they fostered? One result, after these fifty years, is that 
after the death of Stalin, instead of forging ahead, they retrogressed toward 
revisionism, toward new forms of bourgeois restoration, and toward a capitalist 
system manifesting itself to varying degrees in new guises.42 
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However, this turn away from the USSR would not isolate China, but force its leaders to 
focus their efforts on maintaining and strengthening relations in the Third World.  
Chinese focus on foreign relations with the Third World nations “began as early as 
January 1950, [when] Liu Shaoqi had argued that the road taken by China should be 
followed by all peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries so that they may achieve 
their independence and a people’s democracy.”43 China expressed its support for 
decolonization and non-alignment of Third World nations at the Bandung Conference in 
April 1955, when Zhou Enlai took a leading role in promoting the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, which would shape the core of Chinese foreign policy for years to 
come. These principles, fashioned between China and India a year earlier, declared:  
1. Mutual Respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.  
2. Mutual non-aggression.  
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.  
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.  
5. Peaceful co-existence.44  
 
These principles would become a major factor of Chinese foreign relations. In July 1955, 
Zhou again spoke upon China’s commitment to foreign relations in the Third World, stating,  
The people demand the abolition of military blocs which create splits and hostility 
between nations…the people of Asia and Africa, in particular, are opposed to such 
military blocs, since it is quite clear that the colonialists are using such military blocs 
as a means of setting up their colonial rule.45  
Particularly significant in this diplomatic alliance of Afro-Asian states, is that as early as 
1955 there are clear efforts by China to distance itself from the USSR and assert its own 
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dominance as an ally and potential leader of the Third World.46 In addition, the Chinese 
method of building relationships with states on the basis of nonintervention countered the 
aggressive diplomacy of both superpowers. 
Throughout the next decade, the PRC would make great efforts to bolster their 
relations with Third World nations. In 1957 Mao stated: “It is my opinion that the 
international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the 
world today, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying, ‘Either the East 
Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind.’ I believe 
that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism 
have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.”47 Focusing attention on 
Third World nations obviously had an ulterior motive for Mao, who wished for Maoist style 
socialism to spread the world over. China’s sphere of influence would expand, in hopes of 
forming a united front from below to unite the masses of society against imperialism. 
However, this dogmatic support for world socialism was mostly only a verbal commitment. 
For the most part China stuck to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and aimed to 
benefit world revolution primarily as a diplomatic ally and model revolutionary state. As 
such, this support was not limited to those who promoted communism, but rather directed to 
any who opposed “the existing international order, even if they were not entirely consistent 
with Chinese ideological preferences.”48  
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In pursuing relations with the Third World, Zhou Enlai held a major role. In 1963 
Zhou embarked on a seven-week tour of Africa that would pave the way for future economic 
and technological trade and assistance. In 1964 aid deals and loans were agreed upon 
between China and Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Congo, and the United Arab Republic, and in 
1967 China undertook the multi-million dollar project to construct the Tanzania-Zambia 
railway.49 Zhou’s pragmatic diplomatic style was effective, but his negotiations were not 
without their own difficulties. For example, the Second Afro-Asian Conference, aimed at 
recommitting the nations of the Third World to opposing imperialism, never convened. 
China was dedicated to keeping the Soviet Union out of the conference, while Indonesia and 
India supported their inclusion. Further difficulties arose when China and Indonesia called 
for other states to abandon the United Nations, and in 1965 when many implicated China in 
supporting the coup of Algerian president and Soviet supporter Ben Bella.50  
The failure of the Second Afro-Asian Conference marked a critical juncture in Zhou 
Enlai’s foreign policy dealings. Soon after, the failed Indonesian coup led by Sukarno 
supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party resulted in the purging of the state’s leftists 
and deterioration of Sino-Indonesian relations as Chinese ally Sukarno fell from power.51 
Andrew Hall Wedeman’s book The East Wind Subsides marks this event as an important 
factor in the origins of the Cultural Revolution. Wedeman asserts that because of the close 
relationship fostered between Sukarno and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier and the Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi faced impending censure from the Central Committee General Secretariat, 
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an organization headed by many Liu-Deng supporters. Zhou, who had already ceded some 
of his powers in foreign relations to Liu at the start of the 1960s, and who opposed Liu’s 
burgeoning desire to “revive the Sino-Soviet alliance to counter United States military 
activities in Vietnam,”52 responded to this threat by joining Mao’s clique. At this critical 
juncture, Mao’s desires aligned with Zhou’s. In 1970 Mao told Edgar Snow that one major 
factor in the decision to purge Liu was that his desire to counter the United States in 
Vietnam would have delayed the Cultural Revolution.53 This suggests that while Mao 
advocated for revolutionary turmoil within China, the state still required stable foreign 
relations to fulfill the aims of the Cultural Revolution.  As such, the breaking of Zhou’s 
neutrality gave Mao not only the decisive political advantage he needed to purge of Liu and 
Deng, but also a valuable ally whose pragmatic foreign policy aims could be relied upon.54 
The reawakening of the Mao-Zhou alliance was a vitally important aspect of foreign policy 
throughout the Cultural Revolution. While Mao would continually push for revolution and 
rule from the masses at home, Zhou Enlai’s connections to Mao and political awareness 
would help Chinese foreign policy (and indeed, the Chinese state itself) brave the storm of 
the Cultural Revolution. This suited Mao’s needs, for in the realm of foreign policy, the end 
goal of the Cultural Revolution was for China to serve as the leader of proletarian 
internationalism.  
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B. Promoting Revolution by Example 
The apparent isolation of China during the Cultural Revolution was not a jingoistic 
reversal of former policy, or the failure of the East Wind, but rather a doubling down on the 
hope that the revolutionary Chinese model, rather than the revisionist Soviet Union model, 
could serve as a basis for proletarian internationalism. “In 1967 Mao not only called China 
‘the political center of world revolution’ but also proposed that is become ‘the military and 
technical center of the world revolution.’”55 Mao’s Cultural Revolution was not a turn away 
from international affairs, but rather an attempt to set an example for revolution. A task the 
Soviet Union’s revisionists had betrayed. Throughout the first half of 1966, the Taiyuan 
Acrobatic Troupe toured throughout Africa, promoting Mao Zedong thought and 
demonstrating the physical and cultural strengths of the Chinese people. A People’s Daily 
article from July summarizes the tour, and provides some quotations from African observers. 
The headlining quote, which the article claims is representative of many African people’s 
thoughts, states, “Mao Zedong benefits the Chinese people, so the Chinese people praise 
him; Mao Zedong benefits the people of the world, so the people of the world respect and 
love him.” Another claims, “Through your acrobatic art, you can see revolutionary China’s 
great strength and extraordinary future. That’s why America fears China so much, because 
China is so revolutionary, and possesses great strength.”56 A wealth of other articles were 
published in the People’s Daily throughout the Cultural Revolution, with headlines like “The 
African People Praise Chairman Mao’s Writings as a Revolutionary Well-spring,” “African 
Freedom Fighters Enthusiastically Praise China’s Cultural Revolution,” and “Mao Zedong 
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Thought is a Bright Light Towards Victory, African Freedom Fighters Learn and Apply 
Mao Zedong’s Writings in their Struggles.”57These media publications reveal a major 
international goal of the Cultural Revolution, to promote the Maoist model of revolution. In 
addition, the excessive publication of articles like this within China also serves to reinforce 
the concepts of the Cultural Revolution to the Chinese people at home, as proof of the 
inspirational effect of the Cultural Revolution abroad. 
Lin Biao’s pamphlet “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War” (1965), outlines 
his similar understanding of China’s unique role in the international system, which is 
headlined by Mao’s theory of people’s war. Lin states: 
[Mao’s] theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the 
encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal 
practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed 
nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed 
nations and peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America…58 
 
In Lin’s own theory, Mao’s strategy, as employed against the Japanese and Guomindang in 
the 1940’s, can be adapted to the world at large. Taking North America and Western Europe 
as the cities of the world, and Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the encircling countryside, 
this Chinese model should (and will be, in Lin’s mind) followed to pave the way for a 
socialist world revolution. If there was any remaining doubt as to who Lin Biao viewed as 
the antagonists in this struggle, one need not go further than the next two section titles in the 
pamphlet: “Defeat U.S. Imperialism and Its Lackeys by People’s War,” and “The 
Khrushchev Revisionists are Betrayers of People’s War.” This final section is particularly of 
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interest due to Lin’s criticism of the Khrushchev revisionists “general line of peaceful 
coexistence, peaceful transition and peaceful competition.”59 This line is one that Zhou Enlai 
himself had advocated in the past,60 and bares striking resemblance to his official treaty on 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence penned with India in 1954. Despite these 
disagreements, one must be careful to note that while Zhou himself advocated for peaceful 
coexistence, he still strongly believed in China’s unique role as leader of the revolutionary 
Third World. At the height of domestic turmoil in the summer of 1967, Zhou remarked to 
Shirley Graham, the widow of African-American historian and activist W.E.B. Du Bois, 
“The whole Chinese Revolution may go down to defeat for a while. We may lose 
everything. But never mind. If we are defeated here, you in Africa will learn from our 
mistakes, and you will develop your own Mao Zedong, and you will learn to do it better. 
And so in the end, we shall succeed.”61  As Lin rose at the start of the Cultural Revolution to 
become Mao’s successor, the question of foreign policy would remain an essential aspect of 
the Cultural Revolution. While all parties in power seemed to share the ideological desire to 
spread socialism and liberate people from imperialism by way of Mao’s example, their 
methods for doing so would be an item of contention. 
C. The Defense of Pragmatism 
While Lin and others along the revolutionary Maoist line supported the chaotic mass 
movements of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai was forced to go on the defensive to 
preserve the Foreign Ministry, and by default Chinese foreign relations. In 1967, Zhou was 
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forced to recall all Chinese ambassadors to Beijing, following in line with Cultural 
Revolution goals to crack down on corruption and misuse of power. Reactionary and 
revisionist elements arose to combat each other inside the foreign ministry, as they did in the 
streets of Beijing.62 Despite taking great efforts to protect those within the foreign ministry 
while not overtly opposing the Cultural Revolution, Zhou failed to fully protect Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi, who was subjected to criticism and eventually fell out of politics 
altogether.63 While Zhou faced domestic attacks on his offices in Beijing, he was also forced 
to deal with a number of international crises prompted by the revolutionary fervor of the 
time. Chinese students in the Soviet Union quarreled with authorities, leftist riots broke out 
in Hong Kong, and Red Guards in Beijing attacked the Soviet embassy, beat secretaries of 
the Indian embassy, and eventually even sacked and burnt down the British embassy.64 
Immediately after these attacks, some leftist leaders rose to confront Zhou’s policies in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Guan Feng is said to have stated, “the leading ideology within 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not Chairman Mao’s guiding ideology of daring to wage a 
tit-for-tat struggle, but one of fear!” Despite these upheavals, Zhou survived the Cultural 
Revolution as bureaucrats and leftists to either side were purged. While some attempts were 
made to criticize Zhou, like the May 16th Movement, his close ties to Mao and importance to 
the foreign ministry seemed to allow Zhou a great deal of immunity. Moreover, “his 
practical strategy of seizing power selectively, at a crucial stage, served Mao’s goal of 
revolutionizing the ruling structure while maintaining the continuity and stability of the 
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government apparatus.”65 The foreign ministry’s selection as an aspect of the government 
that deserved protection from the revolution around it reveals how much importance Mao 
placed on foreign relations throughout this period. 
D. Contradictions and Principles in Chinese Foreign Policy 
Zhou’s survival through the Cultural Revolution, and Mao’s turn against the ultra-
leftist factions of the party at the end of the 1960s marked yet another crucial juncture for 
Chinese foreign relations. Lin Biao’s standard to support proletarian internationalism while 
rebuking both the Soviets and Americans as imperialists fell away as Zhou Enlai yet again 
took helm of foreign relations and began to promote rapprochement with the United States. 
In Maurice Meisner’s Mao’s China and After, the author states that Zhou began to advocate  
“a new global diplomatic strategy based on the rather traditional principles of national 
sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and the establishment of friendly relations ‘between 
states with different social systems.’”66 However, this was not so much a new global 
strategy for China as much as a return to pre-Cultural Revolution norms. Of course, 
diplomatic rapprochement with the United States was unprecedented in prior years, but 
Zhou’s foreign policy based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence had already 
fostered relations with dozens of states with different social systems. The majority of these 
states were part of the Afro-Asian group that the PRC had pursued for decades, but the list 
also included many western states such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Switzerland, France, Italy and Canada, all before the PRC’s UN appointment.67 However, I 
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do agree with Meisner in that this shift does mark a reversal, in that rapprochement with the 
United States does seem to be a betrayal or at least a “politically damaging repudiation of 
the vision of a worldwide “people’s war” that Lin had promoted.68 There could be no 
encirclement and defeat of the urban nations of the world by those of the countryside if 
China was aligned with one of the major urban powers. Lin’s attempted coup in 1971, which 
was likely an orchestrated purge and assassination by Mao, could very well have been tied 
to his opposition to rapprochement with the United States. Lin indicated in private that he 
opposed the policy, and Mao told Nixon: “In our country also there is a reactionary group 
which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was they got on an airplane and fled 
abroad.”69 However it is hard to determine how truthful this statement may be. Whatever the 
reasons for Lin’s downfall, Mao and Zhou’s efforts to build a relationship with the United 
States stood in stark contrast to Lin’s desire to take on and defeat all imperialist aggressors 
of the world. 
While the Cultural Revolution was in part a response to Soviet revisionism stemming 
from their détente with the United States, China’s revolutionary faithful could see their own 
rapprochement with the United States as revisionism on the part of Mao and Zhou 
themselves. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals rightly claim that this move of 
China seeking their own détente with the United States made “nonsense of all its ideological 
hyperbole of the previous five years.”70 While fears of war with the Soviets amid border 
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clashes appeared to be the rationale for quelling ideology, Macfarquhar and Schoenhals 
argue that is was “far safer in the early 1970s than it had been in the late 1960s to maintain 
ideological purity and wish a pox on the houses of both superpowers,” yet Mao chose 
otherwise because he valued China’s national interests more than is own ideology.71 Other 
interpretations paint this shift in policy simply as a temporary alliance to bring about long 
term gain. Joseph Camilleri argues “the reorientation of policy was strongly influenced by 
the Maoist analysis of rifts in the enemy camp and the unprecedented opportunities they 
offered for a greater Chinese presence on the world stage.” Camilleri cites the printing of 
Mao’s 1940 ‘on Policy’ in Red Flag and People’s Daily shortly after the announcement of 
Kissinger’s impending visit to China. This essay urges people to combine alliance and 
struggle and “underlined the desirability of taking advantage of all ‘fights, rifts and 
contradictions in the enemy camp and turning them against our present main enemy.’”72 
After all, despite the rapprochement, the Chinese press continued to strike out against 
American imperialism unabated, heavily criticizing the Vietnam War73 and continually 
criticizing American involvement in the Third World74.  In either interpretation, the sacrifice 
of ideologically pure Maoist internationalism is done in pursuit of Chinese national interests 
and influence on the world stage. Mao preserved the foreign ministry and protected allies 
like Zhou who were instrumental in forging relationships with Third World leaders during 
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the Cultural Revolution for the same reasons. The opening of relations with the United 
States can be seen along the same lines, despite its much larger scope. It can be argued to 
what extent Mao or Zhou still believed these gains would later aid a Chinese-led world 
revolution, but it is clear that China would not waver in their support for the Third World. 
On October 25th, 1971 the PRC gained the two-thirds majority required to become 
the representative of “China” in the United Nations over Taiwan, and received a spot on the 
Security Council. They received 76 out of 111 votes, 26 of them from African nations.75 In 
February 1972, Nixon’s visit to China marked a new chapter for Sino-American relations. 
Zhou Enlai was well aware that China’s success in the United Nations, and subsequent 
opening to the west was in no small part due to the support of the Third World. In an 
interview following China’s appointment to the United Nations in 1971, Zhou outlined his 
thoughts, “If the statements of the small and medium-sized countries are ignored and if 
things are decided only on the basis of statements by the major powers, this violates the 
premise that small, medium and major nations are uniformly equal.” Yet even as champion 
of the Third World, Zhou made sure to distinguish China from the other superpowers, “Our 
principles are clearcut ones. We are opposed to the ‘major powers,’ to power politics and to 
domination. We will not become a major power under any circumstances.”76 Within the 
framework of the now very public forum of the United Nations, China reshaped, and 
rebranded Lin Biao’s theory into the ‘Three Worlds Theory’. Created in part by Mao, and 
presented to the United Nations by Deng Xiaoping in 1974, this concept divides the world 
into three parts. The superpowers make up the First World, industrialized nations the Second 
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world, and socialist and oppressed nations the Third. Intact from Lin’s theory is the idea that 
First world nations were to be a target for revolution by the Third World, proving that 
despite rapprochement with the United States, ideology was still very much alive in Chinese 
foreign policy.77 The primary difference in Chinese foreign policy before and after 
rapprochement with the United States is the emphasis placed on revolution to displace 
imperialism rather than capitalism. The world conflict outlined by Deng in 1974 was not the 
same formula as the bipolar relationship of countryside versus cities or communism versus 
capitalism as described by Lin. Communist, or even Maoist ideology did not play as large a 
role as the simple struggle of the strong nations against the weak. “Attention in the 1970s 
was focused almost exclusively on the hegemonic and exploitative policies of the 
superpowers, and on the resistance they aroused among medium and small powers.”78 With 
this standard in place, China could criticize the United States and other nations while 
maintaining diplomatic connections. The efforts of world revolution with Chinese backing 
was not to displace the entire political systems of their rival states, but to back smaller 
nations in their attempts for liberation and self-determination from them. As such, this new 
policy bears much more similarity with Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence than with Lin’s theory. 
 China’s emergence from the Cultural Revolution as a major player on the world 
stage is not so much an aggressive leap forward by Chinese foreign policy, as a proof of its 
defensive fortitude. The role of China as a supporter of the world’s small and medium sized 
nations is not only a mantle the nation still bears today, but one Zhou Enlai set out to 
establish in the 1950’s. The emphasis placed on noninterference and peaceful coexistence, 
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as outlined in the Five Principles and reiterated at the Bandung conference, were primary 
factors for China’s support in the UN and acceptance by the West. The rise of dogmatic 
Maoism during the Cultural Revolution, as evidenced in Lin Biao’s opposition to 
coexistence with either superpower, threatened the success of these policies. Yet while the 
foreign ministry came under siege and Chinese radicals caused chaos abroad, it was Mao 
himself who recognized the need for a stable foreign policy under Zhou Enlai’s pragmatic 
leadership.  Foreign affairs played a critical role during the Cultural Revolution, and helped 
bring the PRC into the international fold. However, the diplomatic successes of China in the 
early 1970’s were not evidence of a radical shift from pre-Cultural Revolution policies as 
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IV. African Outreach: China and the Tanzam Railway 
I have spent a good deal of time discussing the nature and methods deployed by the 
Chinese government in order to promote the concept of Maoist Internationalism to their own 
people. Their attempts to publicize and popularize Sino-African relations were not only an 
extension of Chinese nationalism, but as an essential aspect of the proposed international 
socialist world order, which worked to build a united Third World of nations which shared 
very brief historical relationships. The Chinese Communist Party mainly relied upon its own 
common channels of communication and propaganda to educate and inform their population 
about this new relationship: newspaper articles, rallies, big character posters, commissioned 
artwork, and official speeches all helped to solidify the symbolic unity of the Chinese and 
African people. The next step towards making this vision a reality relied upon acting upon 
these promises of unity and creating a relationship with not only the governments of new 
African states, but their people as well. This task would appear to be much more difficult for 
the CCP to undertake. For while their own people could be trusted to respond positively to 
the familiar signs of propaganda that were utilized ubiquitously in Chinese society, these 
same techniques could not be wholly relied upon to entice their newfound allies from the 
Third World.  While economic, diplomatic, and military ties would come to bind China with 
various African nations, this relationship was from the start built to be a unity between the 
people, in the Maoist fashion. Socialism and the Chinese model for revolution were 
encouraged and promoted through the various foreign policy initiatives of the PRC, yet the 
key component of their successes in Africa was their nonconditionality.  
Various African liberation movements required aid in the form of weaponry and 
training, yet many were reluctant to turn to the imposing powers aligned with the West or 
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the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Sino-African relations were built from the ground up as a 
project without any colonial vestiges. China’s true success in securing the trust of the 
African people lay in their shared revolutionary history. While other nations reached out to 
these newly liberated nations with conditional loans and heavy ideological pressure, as 
former members of their own revolutionary struggle, Chinese leaders understood that what 
would really bring the Chinese and African states closer together was a healthy respect for 
sovereignty. Leaders of liberation movements and upstart governments in Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and various other locales accepted Chinese aid and utilized 
elements of Chinese socialism in their state ideology; yet were very clear in delineating that 
China’s relationship with Africa was not simply the emergence of a new colonial power. 
Despite Chinese influences, the origins and practice of African socialism were very different 
from that of Maoism. Thus, while one could argue that the Chinese were attempting to use 
or exploit their ties in Africa to promote their own interests, it is just as easy to state that 
African liberation movements took advantage of Chinese aid with no interest in embracing 
Maoist socialism as the leaders in China intended. In reality these relationships were not so 
nefarious, but policies of mutualism. While the parties of any relationship will act in their 
own self-interest, a successful pairing depends on compromise. In this respect, while 
Chinese propaganda at home emphasized the future centrality of China in a system of 
international Maoism, in their international dealings ideology was secondary to liberation. 
Similarly, African liberation movements utilized Chinese aid, yet made no promises to 
embrace Maoism. However, elements of Maoist ideology were utilized in efforts to promote 
the goals of liberation. The key concept that made a win-win scenario like this possible was 
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nonconditionality and respect for national sovereignty, both aspects of Zhou’s outline of 
Peaceful Coexistence.  
Chinese funded projects like the Tanzam Railway, were emblematic of nonconditional 
Chinese support for a liberated Africa. This project, and the various other ties promoted 
between China and the up and coming revolutionary leaders of East Africa enabled political 
and ideological victories of several liberation movements, while simultaneously helping 
promote Sino-African political unity and friendship. In this chapter I will use the Tanzam 
Railway as a case study in an effort to elaborate upon the influence and strategy of China’s 
Maoist Internationalist movement. In addition, the ties between China and various other 
states and nations in South-East African will also be included to provide a context for the 
breadth of Sino-African relations during the 1960’s and 1970’s. In navigating the desires 
and actions of both the Chinese and African leaders, one must take into account the effect of 
signification and coding in political discourse. The mutualism that flourished between China 
and African liberation movements in these decades was ensured by each party cleverly 
dancing around their own true desires to promote a relationship upon the values they 
compromised upon – namely Peaceful Coexistence and anti-imperialism. A semiotic 
analysis of these discourses, through the lens of the Tanzam Railway project and the 
surrounding liberation movements of the time will be used to deconstruct the stereotype of 
the Third World puppet state or claims of exploitation and neocolonialism. Through this 
analysis, it can be seen that it was not the ideological strength of Maoist Internationalism 
that helped shape Sino-African relations, but the success of China’s soft power initiatives 
and position as a model revolutionary state with a great deal of offer African liberation. The 
continuation of strong Sino-African relations today demonstrates how China’s Third World 
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connections were not built upon ideals of a socialist world order so much as upon the 
promise of stability and respect for new and developing nations.  
 
A. China, Tanzania and Nyerere 
China’s links with the East African nations of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which would 
merge in April 1964 to become Tanzania, were solidified nearly from the start of their 
independence. Tanganyika was the tenth African state to recognize the PRC in December 
1961, shortly after obtaining their independence from the United Kingdom. Within the next 
few years, the bonds between the two countries were strengthened as Tanganyikan President 
Julius Nyerere and Zhou Enlai both set forth plans to visit each other’s countries in 1964. 
However, the tumultuous events of the year, which included the Zanzibar Revolution, a 
mutiny by the Tanganyikan army, and the eventual union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika into 
Tanzania, prevented either visit from occurring. However, these events did serve to enable a 
stronger relationship between the newly formed Tanzania and China. In the wake of 
Tanzania’s discord, China began to provide military assistance to the Tanzania People’s 
Defense Force, and began to assist the nation in developing self-reliance from the United 
Kingdom. This was accomplished through the use of development aid, trade agreements and 
various other treaties promising friendship and increased commerce between the two 
nations.79  
Zhou Enlai eventually made it to Dar es Salaam in 1965 and Nyerere’s came to China in 
1965 and 1968, in which he “stressed that he had “come to learn.’”80 While one must be 
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careful not to ascribe Chinese influence as the sole factor in Nyerere’s philosophy on 
governance, I would be remiss not to note the shift that Tanzania’s governance took towards 
socialism in the midst of this blossoming of Sino-Tanzanian relations in the 1960s. In 
February 1967, Nyerere’s “Arusha Declarion” marked a great shift in Tanzanian policy 
towards socialism and self-reliance. The nationalization of banks, establishment of 
communal Ujamaa villages, and increasing focus on internationalism came about the next 
few years. In 1971, Nyerere’s party TANU (Tanzania African National Union) set out in an 
official document that advancing the Tanzanian revolution required “cooperation with all 
friendly, socialist, revolutionary countries.”81 During another visit to Beijing in 1974 
Nyerere stated that, “Two things convince me that socialism can be built in Africa and that it 
is not a Utopian vision. For capitalism is ultimately incompatible with the real independence 
of African states. The second thing which encourages me is China…China is providing an 
encouragement and an inspiration for younger and smaller nations which seek to build 
socialist societies.”82 These statements and actions appear to be a perfect reflection of every 
ideal proposed by International Maoism. Self-reliance, international cooperation between 
Third World nations, revolutionary society, communal village projects, large overhead 
nationalization are all tenets reflected in the discourse of Mao and Tanzanian leadership 
beginning in the late 1960s. To really emphasize these similarities I must also make one 
more comparison. Consider Maoist policies such as the “Down to the Countryside 
Movement” in relation to this next example:  
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Efforts have also been made to decentralize government and party power in Tanzania 
to leave more opportunity for initiative at the grass-roots level. The Tanzanian 
leadership has attempted to integrate manual and intellectual work: examples of this 
have been the establishment of farms in primary schools, the introduction of national 
service for students in higher education, and the President’s symbolic period of 
physical labor in the countryside.83 
 
Were these policies enacted because of an overwhelming Chinese influence over the 
Tanzanian President? While the various economic and political ties between the two nations 
certainly didn’t hurt, one must be careful to note that African Socialism is not simply a 
foreign importation. Maoism was not simply a carbon copy of Soviet communism or pure 
Marxist thought, but an ideology forged together with unique Chinese characteristics. In the 
same manner, African Socialism as promoted by Nyerere and other leaders of the time had 
strong domestic roots. Nyerere’s socialist projects attempted to adopt “the same socialist 
attitude of mind which in the tribal days gave to every individual the security that comes of 
belonging to a widely extended family.”84 The principles of Nyerere’s socialism itself were 
rooted in the Swahili word ujamaa, which literally likened socialism to the notion of an 
extended family. The reason Maoism had any successful implementation in the policies of 
Nyerere and other African leaders is because they saw it as a useful adjunct to the 
homegrown socialism that already found its roots in African society.  
Nyerere’s conceptualization of African Socialism was intrinsically linked to Pan-
Africanism, and helped pave the way for Tanzania as a key organizational base for various 
guerrilla fighters from across the continent. Nyerere’s adoption of Chinese style 
collectivization was based upon ujamaa, his one-party state borrowed “as much from pre-
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colonial Africa’s kingly traditions as from the Chinese Communist Party,”85 and secured 
Chinese support for the Tanzam Railway to help pave the way for the future liberation of 
southern Africa. Nyerere’s Tanzania, bolstered by Chinese support, would become an 
example of Pan-African cooperation. Nyerere continued to navigate between the ideologies 
of Maoist Internationalism and those of Pan-Africanism, as evidenced by his speech at the 
last Pan-African Congress in 1974, in which he placed the “opposition to racialism, 
colonialism, oppression and exploitation everywhere” in “the context of a worldwide 
movement for human equality and national self-determination.”86 In this manner, the Pan-
African movement, which was already founded upon roots of internationalism, intertwined 
itself with the tenets of International Maoism. 
 
 B. The Tanzam Railway 
 Alongside several large packages of development and military aid, the most 
impactful undertaking of China in Africa was the building of the Tanzam Railway. At the 
time the project was the third largest foreign aid project ever undertaken, and remains 
China’s biggest single foreign aid contribution.87 While a link between Tanzania and 
Zambia has originally been envisioned by Cecil Rhodes as part of a Cape to Cairo line, the 
project that was eventually developed served to protect to autonomy of the newly liberated 
black African nations. At the beginning of the 1960s Tanzania’s Nyerere and Zambia’s 
                                                
85 Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, “A Plundering Tiger with Its Deadly Cubs? The USSR and China as 
Weapons in Engineering of a “Zimbabwean Nation,” Entangled Geographies: Empires and Technopolitics in 
the Global Cold War, Gabrielle Hecht, ed., (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011), 244 
 
86 Minkah Makalani, “Pan-Africanism,” Africana Age, (New York Public Library Project), URL: 
http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-pan-africanism.html.  
 
87 Rosalyn J. Rettman, The Tanzam Rail Link: China’s “Loss Leader” in Africa, World Affairs, Vol. 136, 
No. 3 (World Affairs Institute Winter 1973-1974), 232. 
 
  42 
Kaunda began drawing up plans for a railway link between their two countries. After 
Zambian independence in 1964, the nation still found itself dependent on the white African 
nations to the south.  
Her railways were part of Rhodesia Railways; the coal for her extremely important 
copper mining came from Rhodesia; her source of electricity was the Kariba Dam, 
the powerhouse of which is located on the Rhodesian side of the Zambezi River; her 
oil cam via Rhodesian pipelines; her food imports came through Mozambique and 
Rhodesia; a great number of her consumer projects imported South Africa; and her 
copper was exported almost totally through Rhodesia and Mozambique.88 
 
The Tanzam Railway would help circumvent the fears of a southern blockade of these 
resources by providing Zambia with alternate routes for economic freedom. Tanzania’s 
desire for a railway to Zambia similarly contained both ideological and economic interests. 
On the one hand, the Tanzam Railway would link the weaker Zambian to Tanzania, one of 
the central points for Pan-African liberation movements, and help create a stronger united 
front of black African states.89 On the other hand, economically the Tanzam Railway would 
benefit all three involved parties. Zambia and Tanzania would enjoy increased trade, new 
fertile areas would be opened up for development, China would benefit from increased 
exportation into Africa, and copper from the Zambian copper belt could be bought by 
foreign parties (such as the Chinese) without having to travel through Rhodesia.90  
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Of course, the building and financing of the Tanzam Railway would also serve to 
solidify China’s role as a leader of Third World liberation movements. As seen in Figure 5, 
China remained dedicated to maintaining their position as a revolutionary partner to Third 
World nations.91 While many Western governments refused to fund the Tanzam Railway, 
China took the initiative in September 1967 by signing a tripartite agreement to survey, 
build and finance it. The 1,060-mile project, which would link Zambia’s copper belt to the 
Tanzanian port city of Dar es Salaam, began in April 1970 and was completed in 1975. The 
Chinese impact in building the Tanzam Railway was not solely a political one. 60,000 
Africans were employed in the construction of the Tanzam Railway, and the economic and 
ideological benefits of the line would have a direct impact on the people of Zambia and 
Tanzania.92 Many who worked on the Railway gained skills to be in its employ their entire 
life, while many farmers and commodity traders alike relied upon the Railway’s passenger 
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Figure 5: “Serve the 
Revolutionary People of the 
World”, (1971) A Chinese 
worker on the Tanzam 
Railway. 
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corridors between cities to sell their products and bring consumer goods to local markets. 
The line’s transportation capabilities brought mining, forestry and fishing industry (and 
jobs) to untouched areas.93 In Eastern Africa, the line was called the Uhuru (Freedom) 
Railway.94 It was a symbol of “revolutionary solidarity and resistance to the forces of 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism.”95 The Chinese press recorded a number of 
quotes from local East African’s during the process of building the Tanzam Railway. While 
their validity may not be of the highest degree of journalistic integrity, I believe they are of 
interest in order to at least gauge to some degree the impact of the Tanzam Railway. Upon 
hearing that the railway through her village had been completed, one blind elderly lady is 
led by her granddaughter to touch the tracks, “Although I can’t see the railway, I certainly 
want to use my own two hands to feel the Tanzam Railway go through my hometown.”96 A 
worker states, “We want to quickly finish the Tanzam Railway, to thoroughly crush the 
colonialist’s blockade on us.”97 Finally, one quote demonstrates the growing bond between 
the Chinese and African workers on the line, “In order to promptly finish the Tanzam 
Railway, we and our Chinese friends must learn and work together.”98 While examples such 
as these may be nothing more than idle propaganda for the Chinese people, they do reflect 
aspects of the reality that the Tanzam Railway provided to the people of Zambia and 
Tanzania. The line provided a new livelihood for thousands living alongside it, brought in 
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new industries and jobs, and assured the people of the newly liberated states a sense of 
stability in their self-reliance from the southern African states. 
 
C. Public Outreach and Propaganda 
In conjunction with the various forms of foreign aid provided by the Chinese 
government, social outreach programs were undertaken to make direct connections with the 
people of East Africa. China attempted to increase their influence in Africa through the use 
of radio broadcasts. Radio Peking’s English language transmissions provided ideological 
news and commentary alongside music. However, given that radios were still a luxury item 
for many at the time, many of the masses China desired to reach were likely out of earshot 
during their 21 hours of weekly broadcasts. Moreover, the enduring popularity of the BBC 
radio station still held dominance. A survey of educated East African urbanites in in 1964 
and 1966 showed that while in each year 51% and 70% listened to BBC respectively, Radio 
Peking’s numbers were a mere 1% to 8%. While their numbers were on the rise, the Chinese 
were still far behind the British radio station.99 Other examples of Chinese attempts to reach 
out to the African population are evident in the various Chinese publications that found their 
way to the continent. In 1968, Political Scientist George T. Yu reported that in Africa, 
The China Pictorial, Peking review, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 
Mao’s selected works, Swahili translations of Chinese poems for children, etc. have 
all been readily obtainable. In Kampala, a street stand opposite the main Post Office 
sells a wide range of Chinese literature, as well as portraits of Mao and Stalin; in Dar 
es Salaam the Friendship Book Shop carries a full stock of Chinese publications and 
a complete line of Mao buttons.100 
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However, Yu is careful to delineate that access to Chinese publications does not imply that 
the African people were actively reading them and taking in their ideological messages. 
Most of the interest in Chinese publications is among African academics, and even then, an 
editor of an East African intellectual journal at the time “had found that so far as indicated 
by the written word, Chinese influence ideologically among African contributors is minimal 
if present at all.”101 However, Chinese publications and radio broadcasts were making some 
contact with a portion of the population, even if it was not a significant one. In this respect it 
is evident that the Chinese government was attempting to propagate Chinese ideological 
values throughout Africa for the purposes of Maoist Internationalism. However, outside of a 
continuously revolutionary society that is quite accustomed to political movements and 
media, the African population was much less responsive. This is likely due in part to the 
English translations of Chinese works, which comes off as monotonous, and the “equally 
monotonous repetition of ideological symbolism.”102 These problems are a result of a failure 
to carefully signify why Maoism is beneficial for African people. Whereas the denotation of 
these broadcasts may carefully lay out the glories of Maoism, the connotations taken away 
reject the media as ideological blabbering. China’s real successes in Africa were possible 
through direct connection to national leaders, who could accept Chinese assistance for the 
benefit of their own people, while publically communicating and coding the ideologies of 
Maoism in a fashion that not only relates back to the native ideologies of the people, but 
their own national hopes and goals. To that end, where their ideological initiatives may have 
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fallen short, the Chinese government continually focused on providing support for their 
revolutionary counterparts through other methods. 
 Recorded radio broadcasts from Tanzania provide a wealth of evidence for just how 
much effort the Chinese put into strengthening their relationship with not only the Tanzanian 
government, but their people as well. In December 1964, one broadcast reports on the arrival 
of a gift of 15 buses from the Chinese, which Vice President Abeid Karume states will be 
used to help farmers move their produce in and out of towns.103 Another in the same month 
makes note of the departure of seven Zanzibari students, off to China to study finance for six 
months.104 Following Nyerere’s visit to China in February 1965, the newspaper Nationalist 
printed an editorial stating,  
The Chinese people support us Africans in the struggle to oppose imperialism and 
colonialism, new and old, and to win and safeguard out national 
independence…They support the Africans policy of peace, neutrality and 
nonalignment. They support Africa’s desire to achieve unity and solidarity in a 
manner of its own choice as well as its efforts to settle its own internal disputes 
through peaceful consultations…Above all, the Chinese have expressed their respect 
for the sovereignty of the African countries and have undertaken to avoid 
encroachment or interference in our political affairs.105 
 
Ever searching for an endorsement of Sino-African relations, the Peking NCNA 
International Service quoted the statements of the Nationalist on their own radio program. 
On the acceptance of gifts of cars or sewing machines, and arrival of PRC doctors, or the 
laying of a cornerstone on a Chinese financed mill, local Tanzanian radio broadcasts 
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highlighted the contributions China provided their nation.106 And, whereas western 
institutions like IMF and World Bank promised aid and assistance only under the conditions 
of Structural Adjustment Programs, China’s support came with no strings attached.107 There 
were no efforts to attach conditionality for aid upon socialist policy. In this respect China’s 
efforts to establish a foothold in Africa took care to respect the sovereignty of the newly 
liberated countries they supported. While other nations hounded these states to conform to 
their own First or Second World ideals, China acknowledged their need for respect, and was 
successful in establishing a relationship built upon mutual trust and understanding. While 
the history and cultures of China and Tanzania may be wildly different, they both shared 
commonalities in their most recent struggles against colonizing powers, and subsequent 
liberation and nation building endeavors. The ideological shift towards socialism would not 
be an overt pressure by the Chinese state, yet a cultural adoption built upon the ever-present 
model of a successfully liberated state. This soft power strategy did not require conditional 
support, direct military intervention, or even much ideological proselytizing outside the few 
radio broadcasts and Chinese publications in Africa. It relied upon a steady stream of 
physical aid and support on the ground level, and political declarations and connections at 
the top. Finally, a key aspect of Sino-African relations certainly relied upon Chinese support 
for African liberation movements on a larger scale. While media propaganda could be used 
to try and reinforce Chinese ideology, the true builders of Sino-African relations within 
Africa were the guerrilla fighters who learned from China and went on to found their own 
independent nations. 
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D. No Strings Attached: Liberation and Exploitation 
China’s influence in East Africa stretched well beyond the borders of Tanzania and 
Zambia, in that guerilla fighters trained within China went off to practice revolution across 
the continent. Some of those who underwent this training went on to be prominent members 
of new governments, and took with them an appreciation for both the Chinese nation and 
Maoist ideology. Yet when discussing matters of ideological training and packages of 
military and infrastructural aid in the context of the Cold War, it is easy to imagine these 
liberated African nations as having succumbed to the presence of an overlording Chinese 
hegemon. Yet China was the nation many turned to because the West and the USSR were 
seen as the sort of international powers that would reinstate some form of neo-colonial 
control over their “allies.” In 1976, Zambia’s President Kaunda likened the Soviets in Africa 
to “a plundering tiger with its deadly cubs coming through the back door.”108 Yet even when 
grouping China amongst these domineering powers, one must keep in mind that within any 
binary relationship the notion of “use” or exploitation can be muddled. Dr. Clapperton 
Chakanetsa Mavhunga argues that from the eyes of Africans, the larger states “were merely 
sources of guns, military training, and communist ideology-tools with which to liberate 
power for themselves,”109 and that African leaders were not puppets, but:  
‘Playing puppet’ as camouflage to use these communist countries as weaponry for 
designing themselves into nationalists, create guerilla movements, and assemble 
ideological repertoires to engineer colonies into independent nations through warfare 
and diplomatic trickery.110 
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While International Maoism may have been the ultimate ideological goal of Chinese 
intervention in Africa, the goals of the guerrilla fighters were more attuned to their own 
liberation, or at the most the concepts of Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, and African 
Socialism. Obviously these concepts have much in common with International Maoism, 
which is probably indicative of why the peoples of these two very disparate cultures found 
so much to learn from one another. Josiah Tongogara, the commander of ZANU’s liberation 
army in Zimbabwe, trained at a guerilla camp at Nanjing’s Military Academy in 1966. The 
training included two months of education on the Chinese Revolution and communist 
ideology, months more of training in “mass mobilization, military intelligence, political 
science, mass media, and guerilla strategies.”111 The effects of this training are not only 
evident in the effectiveness of ZANU and other revolutionary movements trained in China, 
but in the characteristics of Maoism that carried over into their own liberation of the 
countryside. In the final stages of the Zimbabwean struggle for independence in 1979, 
Tongogara related to a BBC reporter:  
When we open a new area, we don’t just go and fight. First of all we make a study – 
investigation among the masses – they tell us their grievances, and those we exploit 
and use them…and we explain to them why we have come to them, why you are 
fighting this war. They have to understand it.112 
 
Collectivization, utilization of the masses in armed struggle, and the printing of books and 
other media espousing Maoist ideology were all key components of the ZANU strategy.113 
From this perspective it appears that the Chinese efforts in Zimbabwe were a great success, 
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especially with respect to the Soviet backed ZAPU that was also fighting within Rhodesia at 
the time. Yet that is not to say that Zimbabwe today is a proxy or puppet state under Chinese 
control. Arguing that Chinese support for African liberation movements entirely had “No 
Strings Attached” would be ignoring the fact that the spread of Maoist ideology was a 
reality. However, the tactics and ideology of Maoism were adopted not out of coercive force 
on the part of the Chinese, but because they fit the needs of the ZANU guerrilla forces. If 
one wished to twist this mutual relationship into one of exploitation either side could be 
conceptualized as the pawn of the other. I do not believe this is the proper way to 
characterize this relationship, because the presence of any such antagonizing force would 
not yield the same long-term results that have sustained themselves in Sino-African 
relations. It was the concept of mutualism and the well-entrenched foreign policy devotion 
to Peaceful Coexistence that made this a reality. 
Nyerere’s own statement on the subject of aid with no strings attached provides an 
interesting perspective on the state of Sino-Tanzanian relations. I will provide a brief 
semiotic analysis on this text to attempt to illuminate the intentions behind these statements. 
Umberto Eco provides a simple communication model that outlines a basic structure that can 
assist us in our analysis  (Figure 6)114. 
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Figure 6: Umberto Eco’s “Elementary communicational model” 
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In this conceptualization, each of our three texts is the source, or signifier. The transmission 
of this source, in this case through speech or writing, is intended to create a signal that can 
be received and interpreted by the destination party. However, troubles in 
miscommunication may arise in the wake of noise distorting the message as it moves from 
one party to the other, or through the opposite party simply decoding the message in a 
manner that yields a disparate interpretation. Thus in a kind of public statement such as the 
following we will be required to analyze not only Nyerere’s rationales and intentions, but 
the effect his words have on the intended audience. Nyerere’s speech at his welcome 
banquet during his first trip to China in February 1965 marks a new dramatic connection 
between the people of these two disconnected regions. Nyerere commits to the typical 
formal greetings, before making reference to historical Sino-African trade and Zheng He’s 
voyages to Africa, in which he famously brought back a giraffe for the emperor: 
When after our independence…Tanzania began to establish contacts with your 
country we were not really doing anything new. We were merely resuming a 
connection which had been broken off. Along the entire coastal strip of the Tanzania 
mainland we have archeological evidence that strong trade links existed between 
your country and mine in the 13th, 14th, and early 15th centuries…You have in your 
country I believe a drawing of a giraffe which was at that time sent to China from 
east Africa.115  
 
Here Nyerere seeks to create a historical relationship between the Tanzanian and Chinese 
people based upon historical connections and symbolism, in the form of the well-known 
image of Zheng He’s giraffe. Nyerere then continues to solidify the new, contemporary 
connections that China and Tanzania share: 
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The independence of Tanzania has now made possible this renewal of contacts 
between our two countries and also perhaps more important the establishment of 
contacts between our two people (applause). So despite the long distance between us 
our peoples have very much in common. The vast majority in both China and 
Tanzania earn their living from the land or in rural areas and both of us have only 
recently won freedom from the combination of exploitation and neglect which 
characterize feudal and colonial society. There is therefore, much that we can learn 
from each other (applause).116 
 
Here, it is easy to see just how much Nyerere’s own diction and ideology match up with 
those of Maoist Internationalism. One could easily imagine these very same words coming 
from the mouth of Zhou Enlai. It is to be a union not between countries alone, but people. 
Moreover, Nyerere undermines any ideas of Chinese primacy in the relationship by stating 
that there is much to learn from each other, thus equalizing the relationship. However, 
Nyerere is not afraid to address the elephant in the room. Aid for Tanzania is the primary 
driver of China’s relationship with the state, but Nyerere is resolute on protecting Tanzanian 
sovereignty: 
But on one thing we are all determined in Tanzania—all our people are united in the 
decision that cooperation we get from abroad must be completely without strings. 
Those who give us loans or grants or send us technicians to work with us must do 
this because they wish to take part in man’s human development, and not because 
they wish to control our young state. Tanzania is not for sale. Neither our foreign 
policy not our internal policy will be moved one inch as a result of threats to 
withhold of withdraw economic assistance. The policies of our united republic will 
be determined by the needs and judgments of our people and by no other criteria at 
all (applause).117 
  
A message such as this, at the welcome banquet during his first visit to China, is not some 
idle posturing. Despite the relative weakness of the Tanzanian state, Nyerere makes it clear 
that they are tired to being manipulated by foreign powers, and China will be no exception. 
While the only direct response we have to these statements from the Chinese perspective is 
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the recorded signal of applause, I believe Chinas continued dedication to providing Tanzania 
and many other Third World states interest free loans, labor and resources for huge 
infrastructure projects and other forms of no strings attached aid are evidence enough that 
they took Nyerere’s warning to heart. While there was a risk of Nyerere’s transmitted 
message not being properly interpreted by the Chinese leaders within the audience, I think 
an understanding of Tanzania’s position as a newly liberated state helped inform Zhou Enlai 
and others as to the proper course to drive Sino-African relations. Maoist Internationalism 
was to be deconstructed for the African audience, and the tenets of world socialism would 
be left to the side as China aggressively pursued soft power in Africa through a variety of 
nonconditional aid projects. Chinese leaders understood Nyerere’s need for national 
sovereignty and respect in his position as the leader of a nation that had just achieved 
liberation from colonialist control. As such, they provided a foreign policy plan that would 
be much more successful in harboring relations with developing nations than that of the 
Western powers or USSR, who in the midst of the Cold War based their aid off conditional 
free-market policies or other ideological and political restrictions. From the point of view of 
African leaders, guerrilla, fighters, and everyday citizens, China’s commitment to Peaceful 
Coexistence and anti-imperialism, coupled with military training and support, painted China 
as a fresh alternative to the domineering superpowers of the world. Aid from China was a 
source of support that could be relied upon, from a nation that knew quite a bit about 
colonial oppression and guerilla warfare. It was Zhou Enlai’s model of pragmatic foreign 
policy, implanted over the core of International Maoism, which helped make these 
relationships so fruitful. The intertwining of these ideals, with those of the men and women 
in the liberation movement, produced something that could stand the test of time. To that 
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point, China continues to have strong relations with many developing states today, proving 
the effectiveness of this model outside the bounds of Maoist or African Socialist ideology. 
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V. Contemporary Challenges and Triumphs 
 I believe the Sino-African relationship will prove to be a vitally important segment 
of world affairs over the next several decades. The structure and outline of this 
contemporary relationship stems from the idealistic vision of Maoist Internationalism, Zhou 
Enlai’s ideal of Peaceful Coexistence, and various African nation’s dedication to 
independence. I hope that this thesis has not only proved to serve as a general guideline for 
the basic ideology and practical applications of Maoist Internationalism throughout China’s 
revolutionary period, but has helped to explain how two very different regions came 
together to promote a common goal – to stand up for those segments of the world that had 
been oppressed, manipulated, and used by the reigning superpowers. The tenets of Maoist 
Internationalism are at their core appealing to one’s humanist side. When the violent rhetoric 
is put aside, and the barrel of the gun turned down, the doctrine is one that promotes social 
harmony and cross-cultural friendship. It is easy to see why so many people dedicated 
themselves to making this dream a reality.  
The Chinese government utilized their own nationalist discourse to promote Maoist 
Internationalism, and created a new vision for what the Chinese state could be on the world 
stage. While nationalism empowered the Chinese people, internationalism created a 
universal goal that gave meaning and context to the often-tumultuous events of the Maoist 
period. The constant purges, drastic policy shifts, and various revolutionary movements 
were efforts to purify and strengthen the Chinese people dedication to Maoism, and thus his 
dream of an international socialist world. Throughout all of the domestic struggles that 
China endured, the dedication to Maoist Internationalism through the pursuit of foreign 
relations with the nations of the Third World would remain a primary policy goal. China’s 
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foreign policy would come to be defined by Zhou Enlai’s “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence,” which has outlasted the revolutionary fervor of the Maoist Era to become a 
defining trait of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. While capitalism has replaced 
communism wholesale in China, the foreign policy initiatives of the PRC have remained 
remarkably stable for the past 60 years. China has dedicated itself towards championing the 
developing nations of the world, even as its own economy has become one of the world’s 
largest. While profit motive has replaced Maoist ideology, I believe the longstanding 
adherence to this policy is still anchored in the notions of nonintervention and anti-
imperialism as developed in Zhou’s Principles. From the perspective of African leaders, 
China has remained a staunch ally and supporter of both their liberation movements and 
future political and developmental efforts. Even outside the bounds of shared socialist 
ideology, the foreign policy ideals of China have been relied upon because of their 
continued adherence to national sovereignty.  
Yet, while China’s efforts to enable Sino-African cooperation and commerce have 
continued until today, many challenges still exist. While Chinese influence in Africa shaped 
the trajectory of many liberation movements and provided continued assistance and 
friendship in Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and many other African nations, localized 
tensions may be on the rise. The connections that created the strong Sino-African 
relationships of today are built upon mutual understanding, respect for sovereignty, and 
trust. Yet issues have begun to arise. The Chinese black market for ivory, used in traditional 
Chinese medicine, has fueled poaching across Africa. Two Chinese smugglers, found with 
ivory belonging to 226 elephants, were sentenced to 30 years jail time in Tanzania after 
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being arrested in 2013.118 A particularly inflammatory poaching case arose when 66-year-
old Yang Fenglan, the “Ivory Queen,” was arrested for leading a smuggling ring responsible 
for $2.5million worth of poached ivory. Yang had originally come to Tanzania as a 
Kiswahili interpreter in 1975, to help facilitate China’s involvement on the Tanzam 
Railway.119 While the links between these people and their nations may originate in the 
fraternal ideology of Maoist Internationalism, contemporary challenges are to a great degree 
influenced by individuals. The “Ivory Queen” is a unique case in that her ties to Africa date 
back to the beginnings of Sino-African friendship and cooperation, yet over time she has 
taken advantage of these connections to amass personal gain. These fears, that the ties 
between Africa and China have blinded political actors to the new wave of Chinese 
neocolonialism and economic domination in Africa, have been well documented in the 
media. Books have been published, newspaper articles printed, and documentaries made 
chronicling or prophesizing China’s neocolonial agenda in Africa. Yet at the same time, 
many view Chinese continued friendship and promises of aid with no strings attached as a 
welcome alternative to the politically domineering forces of the West. 
The perception of Chinese influence in Africa today could easily shift from one of 
assistance to exploitation if leaders are not careful. Issues have already begun to arise in the 
wake of some Chinese development projects in Africa, because of Chinese employers 
reluctance to utilize local African workforces. Many businesses will ship over entire 
divisions of Chinese workers to complete projects, leaving infrastructure as they leave, but 
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providing little opportunity for African human capital development. African leaders cannot 
sit by idly as their resources are traded for Chinese built highways and stadiums, for the 
development of human capital is essential for the long term self-reliance of any developing 
state. Yet another growing concern may simply be an inevitable repercussion of the very 
economic ties that have united Chinese and African leaders. In the wake of China’s slowing 
economy in the last year, imports from Africa dropped 40% in 2015. China’s economic 
integration with a variety of commodity exporters in Africa would inevitably affect the 
growth and development of these African nations if any greater economic problems were to 
arise. Finally, one cannot simply right off Chinese involvement with violators of human 
rights as Western propaganda. While the Chinese position of nonintervention in the affairs 
of other nations politics and no strings attached aid programs has won them many friends 
amongst leaders of the developing world, partnerships with Sudan in the midst of the Darfur 
crisis and other amicable deals with human rights violators does very little to bolster their 
reputation as a friend of the African people.120 I do not by any means suggest that Western 
powers themselves are innocent in this regard, but in light of this one should not stand by 
these injustices just because they are widespread. Chinese leaders cannot risk popular 
backlash against their operations in Africa, for an association with neocolonialism will not 
help any future foreign policy initiatives. 
Chinese racism towards Africans is one likely reason for the lack of African 
employment by Chinese firms, and is another issue that could produce strain on Sino-
African relations. In May of 2016 a Chinese advertisement for the laundry detergent Qiaobi 
made headlines across social media as “The Most Racist Ad Ever.” In the advertisement, a 
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Chinese woman is approached by a black man who whistles at her and winks in her 
direction. She proceeds to place a packet of detergent in his mouth and stuff him in a 
washing machine, where after a moment he emerges as a Chinese man, to the delight of the 
woman. The company’s initial response to the public outcry was that people are simply too 
sensitive, before a day later making an official apology, which nevertheless places some 
blame on the “over-amplification by the media.”121 Yet while the world may just be catching 
on, anti-black racism in China is not a new phenomenon. In 1979, a clash broke out in China 
between visiting African students and their Chinese counterparts, resulting in around 50 
foreigners and 24 Chinese injured. Throughout the 1980’s various other small-scale conflicts 
between Chinese and Africans occurred throughout China, often fueled by racism. A driving 
factor in these conflicts was Chinese concern over relations between African men and 
Chinese women. In some cases Chinese harassed Africans by calling them “black devils” or 
claiming that they were carriers of AIDS.122 All of this, despite the fact that “in April 1988, 
Communist Party head Zhao Ziyang stated that racial discrimination was common 
‘everywhere in the world expect China.’”123 Within China during this time, African students 
responded to this racism with protests, marches and boycotts.124 More recently, racism has 
been a key element holding back the employment of many Africans who could benefit from 
Chinese investment in their nations. When interviewing a number of Chinese migrant 
entrepreneurs in Africa for his book China’s Second Continent, Howard W. French asked 
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these people why they didn’t hire African workers. One Chinese farmer in Mozambique 
claims, “The market capacity of the blacks is pretty bad. The thing you need to know about 
them is that they only do what they are supposed to do when you are watching them.”125 A 
manager of a copper business in Zambia claims, “Zambians have good bodies. The problem 
is they cannot work hard.”126 He employs a few locals, but opts to hire bricklayers from 
China, paying them twice as much as such a worker would make in China, and about ten 
times what a Zambian could make in the position.127 
 In the BBC documentary The Chinese are Coming, many local Africans are featured 
who take issue with the growing Chinese presence in their region. One man asks why the 
Chinese refuse to hire Zambians for simple jobs like driving a forklift, while local chicken 
farmers claim that Chinese chicken farmers are resorting to foul play by enlarging their 
chickens to take over the market.128 With ever-increasing Chinese investment and migration 
to Africa, tensions between local Africans and Chinese are bound to erupt. However, racist 
attitudes and the undervaluing of the worth of the African individual are making this process 
a lot more troublesome than it need be. One African civil society worker puts it best, “There 
is a risk that they [Chinese leaders] should consider…that one day the people of Africa will 
come to see China as an unfriendly country...That could put all their interests in danger over 
time. They should think about this a little more.”129  These straining forces have already 
broken out of the biased realm of western media to influence African leaders and 
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publications as well. As Julius Malema, leader of the South African political party Economic 
Freedom Fighters puts it:  
We are looking for new partners, we are looking for new investors; but let it be done 
through our own terms as Africans and not through the exploitation of our resources 
and our people by the new colonizer, because this one projected themselves as better 
than the previous colonizer.130 
 
The Chinese promise of nonintervention in political affairs may be seen as a gateway to 
African independent growth and development, yet Malema reveals this projection to be a 
cover for the growing economic influence of China in Africa. Just as capitalism has replaced 
Maoism in the field of Chinese international relations, economic domination has replaced 
the goals of ideological influence and political transformation. 
Despite growing tensions at the local level, many other political leaders still espouse 
the value of Sino-African relations. China’s involvement with Mugabe’s government in 
Zimbabwe has produced a highly integrated relationship, to the degree that Mugabe has 
adopted the Chinese Yuan as Zimbabwe’s primary international currency.131 Many have 
claimed that moves like this, and other aspects of China’s large-scale intervention in Africa 
is a form of neocolonialism. At the China-Africa summit in Johannesburg in December of 
2015, Mugabe spoke out against these claims of Chinese neocolonialism, and praised the 
present Xi Jinping as “a man representing a country once called poor, a country which was 
never our colonizer. He is doing to us what we expected those who colonized us yesterday to 
do…We will say he is a God-sent person.”132 Mugabe’s impression of China is not simply 
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fueled by their continued aid and friendship, but by the very foreign policy ideologies that 
China has continually stood for. China is an example of a country that has come from 
poverty, and an example of an ally who has rebuked the temptations of neocolonialism. 
Kenneth Kaunda, former president of Zambia was asked in an interview in 2014 about the 
relationship between China and Zambia. Reflecting upon the UN vote of 1971, Kaunda says,  
 
We argued strongly, thank God we succeeded in the recognition of China as a true 
member of the United Nations…China, they were strong communists, but that did 
not worry us, that is their way of thinking, and we thought differently and up to now 
we remain good friends, and many of them are here with us, helping us to build 
Zambia in different ways; roads, schools, hospitals and all those organizations that 
are required in human life.133 
 
Kaunda’s recollection of China and Zambia’s shared history demonstrates how these 
vestiges of the Mao Era have continued up until today. The most interesting aspect of this is 
how Kaunda admits that their ideologies did not entirely match up with that of the Chinese, 
but that they simply “thought differently,” and that was perfectly acceptable for their system 
of mutualism. In response to claims of Chinese neocolonialism in Africa, Kaunda has 
pointed to propaganda from the West as a primary source of these claims, stating, “It would 
be wrong to generalize when it comes to China’s relationship with Africa and portray it as 
somehow devilish and out to exploit the continent.”134 Kaunda’s viewpoint places 
responsibility on the Zambian government to uphold Chinese companies to Zambian labor 
standards, and while he admits that some problems have arisen, sees the overall trajectory of 
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China’s African policies as a force for good. “If they helped us [in the 1970s] at a time when 
no one else would, what reasons have I got to doubt them now?”135 From the perspective of 
many leaders, China’s relations with Africa not only have a historical basis, but also provide 
a real hope for independent development in Africa free from the foreign specters of Western 
imperialism. Some popular opinion polls regarding China reflect a popular positive 
association between African people and China. A 2007 Pew Report found that “the balance 
of opinion regarding China is decidedly positive, reflection, to a large extent, the widespread 
view that ‘China’s growing economic power has a positive effect on respondents’ own 
countries, especially in the developing world.’”136 While a bit dated, these associations 
 To some, fears of Chinese neocolonialism are little more than a myth perpetuated by 
the West, who is quickly losing ground to Chinese funded aid projects with no strings 
attached. While China may be establishing deep economic ties and siphoning resources, 
Dambisa Moyo asserts, “Bartering infrastructure for energy reserves is well understood by 
the Chinese and Africans alike. It’s a trade-off, and there are no illusions as to who does 
what, to whom and why.”137 China needs resources from Africa to support their growing 
economy and population, while Africa needs infrastructure, investment, and capital to create 
growth and development.   
 Sino-African relations are unique in that their origins ultimately lie in the 
revolutionary natures of Maoist Internationalism and African liberation struggles. However, 
the true binding element to these similar, yet ultimately very different ideologies was the 
commitment to anti-imperialism and Peaceful Coexistence. While leaders of both regions 
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can look back to the Mao Era or the time of liberation as a reminder of the ties that bind 
China and Africa together, one must be careful to consider that the actions and beliefs of 
individuals within these nations could create substantial rifts. While Maoist Internationalist 
ideology mixed with nationalism propelled many Chinese in the Mao Era to support their 
fraternal socialist allies, today economics are the key driving force for an individual’s 
happiness. While Africans at the dawn of liberation and independence required Chinese aid 
to help fuel their guerrilla fighters and jumpstart their nation’s infrastructure, racism and 
reliance upon the Chinese economy may hamper efforts to boost human capital development 
and negatively affect the image of Sino-African goodwill. Leaders in China and Africa must 
not be so naïve to believe that the norms of the 1960s and 1970s will remain the same 
forever. However, it is also apparent that China’s dedication to Zhou Enlai’s Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence are still very much a key aspect of Chinese foreign policy. While this 
perspective has facilitated opportunities for African growth and development without strings 
attached, it also runs the risk of enabling and reinforcing human rights violations. 
 The most volatile threat to the Sino-African relationship, in quite the Maoist fashion, 
lies in the hands of the masses. African people must influence their leaders to forge deals 
with China that have a chance to create infrastructure alongside African employment and 
human capital development. More organizations and acts such as Zambia’s “Citizens 
Empowerment Act” of 2006 should be adopted and utilized to protect African workers and 
help ensure that Chinese investment in Africa breeds long-term economic independence by 
dedicating a portion of workers on any FDI project to local Africans.138 In addition, Chinese 
leaders must take care to avoid investment in regions where human rights violations are 
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being carried out on a large scale. While sticking to their policies of no strings attached aid 
and nonintervention in political affairs are an essential aspect of preserving Sino-African 
relations, a line must still be drawn somewhere. Finally, Chinese leaders must also take care 
to promote a cultural sense of equality alongside their political egalitarianism. While 
Confucius Institutes have been set up throughout Africa to promote Chinese culture, some 
action must be taken to promote African culture and society to Chinese migrants, in order to 
assist in stemming the racist prejudices that many Chinese bring with them to Africa.139 I 
believe greater integration of African and Chinese workforces on Chinese FDI projects has a 
good chance of fulfilling this goal while simultaneously promoting local human capital 
development. The force that began as Maoist Internationalism helped create contemporary 
Sino-African relations. Influence from the desires African leaders wanted out of this 
relationship, and a shifting Chinese political scene helped transform this relationship into 
one that is held together by neither the ideologies of Maoism or African Socialism, but by 
the shared historical dedication to anti-imperialism and respect for national sovereignty from 
both parties. Today, despite the economic drivers that fuel Chinese investment in Africa, I 
believe that these commitments to Peaceful Coexistence remain a major foreign policy ideal 
of both the China and Africa regions. Reformations, concessions, and difficult negotiations 
will have to be made, yet the potential benefits are simply too great to give up. As such, 
despite a wide array of looming challenges for both parties to navigate, the leaders and 
masses of China and Africa will continue working together to find a route that enables 
mutual development and growth. 
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